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David Cohen*
Allan C. Hutchinson**

Of Persons and Property:
The Politics of Legal Taxonomy

"No theme is more basic ... than the importance of taxonomy viewed, not as a neutral hatrack

for the objective facts of nature, but as a theory that constrains and directs our thinking ....
Taxonomy isa dynamic and creative science of history."
-Stephen Jay Gould***

Introduction

I.
To talk of law without politics or history is nonsensical. All lawyers must
concede that what they do takes place in historical circumstances and has
political consequences. Every piece of law-making and law-application is
a governmental act; it relies on political authority and claims binding
force. Moreover, all legal activity occurs within a particular historical
context; it is intended to respond to or influence a past, existing or
anticipated state of affairs. This means that the study of law must concern
itself with politics and history generally: it must not confine itself to only
the politics and history of law. To do otherwise would be to distort and
trivialise any understanding of law. Within such a broad political and
historical appreciation, the focus of enquiry is not so much on 'law' as on
'law-government' because the idea of law without government is almost
oxymoronic.1 Law is not only a symbol and act of power; it is also a
major component of the social context in which those symbols and acts
of power acquire meaning, significance and effect.
As an instrument of political power and a constituent of historical
consciousness, law and its study connect with some of the most profound
issues on the sweeping agenda of intellectual research. To understand
fully the operation of law, it is necessary to come to grips with turbulent
questions of metaphysics, ethics, sociology and ideology. Any act or
study of law, including this one, is grounded on assumptions about such
matters and which inform the mundane round of legal practice. For
instance, beliefs about the nature of individual identity, human
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
***S.J. Gould, The Flamingo'sSmile 243-44 (New York: Norton, 1985).
1. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition. (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown, 1960) at p.
184. However, some have suggested that, in tribal communities, a non-positivistic law exists
without a formal government order. See Hyde, The Gift" Imaginationand the Erotic Life of
Property.(New York: Random House, 1983). Of course, the converse is not true. There is a
growing and rich tradition of political theory and practice that argues for 'government' without
law. See G. Woodcock, Anarchisn" A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements. (New
York: Meridian Book, 1962).
* Associate
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intentionality, social organisation and moral worth direct and anchor the
criminal process. The fact that such operating premises are not evident to
those who rely on them attests to their pervasiveness and potency. At its
most blunt, understandings about the basic essence and value of
humankind influence and contour debate about the historical function,
political character and normative authority of law.2 Any attempt to
separate the study of law from politics, history and theory is misguided
and misleading.
Although it is a matter of trite learning that law and lawyering are
political, there remains the core belief that the interpretation and
organization of law is, can, and should be performed in an apolitical
manner. 'Formalism', both in rules and categories, continues to be the
ruling theory of legal interpretation. Its central credo is that legal
taxonomy and interpretation comprises the largely impersonal and
determinate operation of practical rationality. While any faith in a crude
reliance on some mechanical algorithm or logical parthogenesis has long
since been abandoned, there is still a tenacious commitment and
aspiration to bounded objectivity and revealed moral truths. While law
is embedded in historical contexts and political circumstances, its
organization and interpretation possesses an important, if not total,
independence from them. As sophisticated formalists like Ronald
Dworkin put it, "law... is deeply and thoroughly political .. ., [b]ut not
a matter of personal or partisan politics".3
In contrast to the received wisdom of formalism, we put forward an
anti-formalist critique. We argue that the claimed dispositive power of
formal rationality is, at best, illusory and, at worst, fraudulent; legal
interpretation and legal taxonomy are more a matter of operational logic
than logical operations. In almost every case, the ingenious judge is
constrained only by the limits of her imagination. Legal doctrine
represents a store of normative principles and argumentative techniques
which are at her disposal to justify and rationalise her choices.
Notwithstanding this, however, the judge is not a conscious manipulator
of an independently-existing set of doctrinal materials or a willing party
to some vast Machiavellian conspiracy. Legal doctrine is more than the
residual traces of the unbounded free-play of the judicial mind. While
judges live in history and society, they repay the compliment, or exact
2. See H. Cantril, Human Nature and PoliticalSystems. (New Brunswik: Rutgers University
Press, 1961). This insight or understanding is far from original. Thomas Hobbes' work rests

upon a very particular and explicit idea of human nature. He argued that, in a state of nature,
life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is a function of political society to provide
people with a way of "getting themselves out from that miserable condition." See T. Hobbes,
Leviathon. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968).
3. R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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their revenge, by living in judges. The posited separation between 'that to
be organized and interpreted' (doctrine) and 'that which organizes and
interprets' (judge) cannot be sustained.
Whereas the formalist locates truth and authority almost exclusively in
doctrine, the nihilist confers that logocentric privilege on the judge. Both
theories ignore the historical dialectic at work between judge and
doctrine; they are situated and shaped by their political milieu, constantly
4
interacting and interpenetrating. Each is implicated by and in the other.
Far from loosening the political bite of the critique of formalism, this
approach sharpens and deepens it: the nihilist is only one kind of antiformalist and a misguided one at that. By treating legal categorization and
interpretation as distinct forms of social activity, a sophisticated theory of
anti-formalism better explains the felt necessities of doctrinal constraints
on interpretive freedom. Further, by locating these constraints within
contingent socio-historical contexts, it exposes their counterfeit claims to
necessity, reveals their political determinants and explains their historical

fungibility.
The essay falls into three major parts. In the first part, we explain and
describe what we believe to be the core idea of law - that it represents
a discursive and taxonomic economy which is used to give meaning to
the world by creating a particular and partial reality. The concepts and
language lawyers use, the way those media are deployed, the
argumentative devices relied upon, and the values inculcated combine in
conscious and unconscious ways to constitute law and a legal style of life.
In part two, we tell two stories. One involves the Supreme Court's
treatment of a young girl whose life was tragically altered after she
participated in a public immunization program; the other involves the
Court's treatment of a mining entrepreneur whose property had been
devalued after he participated in a public parks program. The two stories
represent a stark and compelling example of the power of ideas and the
politics of taxonomy. In the third and final part, we explore alternative
ways of telling these stories and make tentative suggestions for a more
egalitarian vision of law and its intellectual foundations.
II.

Prisonersof the White Lines on the Freeway

1. Other World, ClassicalMusic and Heavy Metal
The world is not given to us. While there is some 'there' out there, there
is no particular 'there' there until we put it there. To live in a world, that
world must first be made. The world is not a hidden chest of existential
4. See Kennedy, "Toward a Phenomenology of Judging" in The Rule of Law: Ideal or
Ideologv. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), (A. Hutchinson and P.Monahan eds.).
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treasures, waiting to be unearthed and exhibited in some vast National
Institute of Canadian Archaeology in Ottawa. Any treasure found will, in
an important sense, have been placed there; it can only be re-created or
re-activated. The world is a coral reef of the mind; living metaphors that
have crystallised and been forgotten, later to be (re)discovered as
independent and 'real'. We only find the world we make and, in
(re)making it, we often find new worlds.5 These are not different worlds
or alternatives to 'reality', but are new and different realities. The worlds
of our historical ancestors and our cultural relations are not our's. The
footprint we find on the future and past shores of the unknown is and will
be our own.
It is tempting to suggest that, through the use of fictive powers and
taxonomic techniques, order is made out of chaos. But the very notion
and sense of 'chaos' is itself a construction; it is not a given. Order and
chaos are only intelligible in terms of the other; the one relies on the other
by its self-defining exclusion of it. Order's critical bite and meaning arise
from being set against some pre-existing understanding of chaos and viceversa: "And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? /
Those people were a kind of solution."'6 A better way of grasping the
nature of world-making is to think of a vast infiniteness. There are not
discrete objects with clear boundaries, but an irreducible continuum with
fuzzy and imposed demarcations. Taxonomy and its intrinsic order have
a history and, therefore, a politics.
In order to exist in a tolerable way, it is necessary for people to reduce
the world to human proportions, finite dimensions and historical
specificity. The world must become familiar and manageable, if it is to be
less threatening to a continuing sense of existential well-being. By the act
of classifying and categorising, a particular reality is created and
internalised. In constituting that world, it will be given an appropriate
externality and ontological status. 7 Yet, in the essential and creative act of
world-making, people also must engage in the equally unavoidable act of
world-ending. To make one world is to abandon, at least temporarily,
other potential worlds. Sight and blindness are simultaneously
experienced. A way of seeing is always a way of not seeing:

5. For a slightly different development of these themes, see A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the
Threshold: CriticalEssays on Modern Legal Thought (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
6. C. Cavafy, "Expecting The Barbarians" in The Complete Poems of Cavafy. (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1961) at pp. 18-19.
7. See J. Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds Cambridge. (Mass.: University Press, 1986).
W Quine, OntologicalRealityand Other Essays (1969); N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking

(Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1978).
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If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man
as it is, infinite.
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks
of his cavern. 8
A high price is exacted for world-making. In order to live,
generalisation and selectivity must occur. Yet, in so doing, it will be the
case that people will necessarily distort, trivialize and overlook: if
something is not excluded, there will be everything and, therefore,
nothing. We often inhabit more than one world in and through time.
Moreover, these conceptual caverns are built from the bricks of
categorization and the cement of exclusion. In this way, caverns become
both shelters and prisons. They act as welcome havens from the
bewildering storms that buffet people throughout history. But, at the
same time, they are dungeons whose walls mark off the limits of a
particular world. At best, glimpses of other possible worlds can only be
glimpsed through the bars of the existing cell-windows. These Blakean
caverns ensure the possibility and parameters of any world: security cuts
both ways. The felt incapacity to imagine different forms of social life to
the present has less to do with the limits of 'reality' than with the limits
of the extant world. The difficulty of learning is negligible as compared
to the almost Sisyphean task of unlearning.
Some examples will serve to concretise these abstract claims - one
visual, another aural and a third normative. For many, the world of
colours seems to be a perfectly natural occurrence in which the different
shades and hues of the spectrum are experienced universally. Yet there is
more to seeing than ordinarily meets the eye. While all normal-sighted
people experience similar stimuli and make sense of the continuum of
electromagnetic radiation by dividing the range of wavelengths into
names of colours, some language groups have different schemes by which
they effect this process. For instance, English speakers 'see' the colour
grey between blue and brown, while the Welsh have no separate
designation for grey and identify it as either g/as (blue) or llwyd (brown).
Moreover, glas, like the Latin glaucus, runs over into the English grey
and green. 9 It can be grasped how the naturally-experienced world of
colour is based upon a scheme of differences that is embedded in the
conventional language of a social group. As such, the English and the

8. William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell" in Blake: Complete Writings of William
Blake. (New York: Random House, 1966) at p. 164. The sexism of this quote is not lost on
us. See infra
9. See L. Hjelmslev, A Prolegomenato a Theory of Language53 (E J. Whitfield trans. 1969)
and C. Belsey, CriticalPractice.(London: Methuen, 1980) at pp. 40-42.
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Welsh inhabit slightly different worlds and experience slightly different
realities.
On a more familiar and personal scale, people often cringe at the
strangeness of hearing their own 'different' voices played back on a tape
recording or of catching a glimpse of their own 'different' image in a
mirror. What we believe is not what we perceive and what we perceive
is not what we sense. We hear with more than our ears and see with more
than our eyes. Not only does interpretation begin where perception ends,
but interpretation is a profoundly political act.' 0 When we 'listen to the
music' much more happens than the passive physical connection between
air molecules and tympanic membranes. To 'listen to the music' involves
a whole apparatus of mental images, intellectual habits, social
assumptions, emotional sets, political affiliations and imaginary
constructs. And, so we do not 'miss' the sound, there has to be a wilful
act of attention. As Walt Whitman put it:
All music is what awakens from you when you are reminded by the
instruments.
It is not the violins and the comets ... nor the notes of the baritone
singer...
It is nearer and farther than they.'
While there may be a similarity of stimuli, there is a very different
reception experienced by different listeners. The classical music buff does
not listen and hear in the same way as the heavy metal fan. The favoured
music of each not only sounds different to the other, but is different. The
sound of music is in the mind and heart of the beholder as well as her or
his ear; sound needs to be placed in an interpretive context before it
becomes music. The world of the Beethoven devotee is not the world of
the Bon Jovi fan. Facts, sights and sounds are shaped as much by internal
considerations as by external signals. Perception is never unaffected by
perspective and experience is always conditioned by the assumptions
with which it is approached.
A third example takes the point a little further and hopefully begins to
support some of our larger claims. In describing the world around us and
the things that comprise it, there is a marked tendency to speak in terms
that are taken to be value-neutral and that are thought to order, represent
or label a pre-given physical world. Allowing for the dissonances
between different language groups, it is assumed that there is a fixed
10. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1970) at p. 198.
11. W Whitman, "A Song for Occupations" from Leaves of Grass (1955) in Walt Whitman,
Complete Peotry and CollectedProse. (New York, N.Y: Literary Classics of the United States;
distributed by Viking Press, 1982), at p. 94.
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reality out there that is separate from our own attempt to give meaning
to it. Surely there are 'trees' that are naturally separate from the flowers
and shrubs surrounding them? Unfortunately (or fortunately), the answer
is far from obvious or uncontroversial. While there is a whole mass of
somethings out there, they do not reveal themselves as particular
somethings without our prompting or connivance.
'Tree' does not possess a positive presence by virtue of having an
independent treeness within it. Its distinctiveness and meaning are the
product of a socially-created and historically-acquired scheme of
taxonomic ordering. The language in which 'tree' functions endows
certain attributes, such as leaves and bark, with a significance in the
meaning-giving enterprise. Within another system of signification, a very
different set of identifying attributes might be considered significant and
meaningful. For instance, categorisation might depend on (a) whether it
can talk; (b) aesthetic appeal; (c) how much it weighed; (d) whether it
can be eaten; (e) et cetera," () how big is it from the distance; (g) the
2
extent of its mathematical possibilities; (h) how much it is worth.'
Accordingly, a thing's identity and meaning is never simply found or
observed, but is always imposed and located within a particular
taxonomic structure. It is less a matter of technical refinement and more
a case of creative designation. There is no form of pure taxonomy or
communication that passively represents instead of actively producing.
The world is within the language and the language within the world. The
world cannot speak for itself; it must be spoken for. Language is a form
of social action and the raw material from which different worlds are
forged. It is a cultural artifact of the first order:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do
not find there ... on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope
flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds - and this
means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up,
organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely
because we are parties to an agreement to organise it in this way .... The
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are
absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the
organisation and classification of data which the agreement decrees. [N]o
individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is
constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself
13
most free.
12. These ideas are borrowed in a slightly adapted form from Peller, "The Metaphysics of
American Law" (1985), 73 Cal L Rev. 1151 at 1162-70 and N. Evemden, TheNaturalAlien.:
Humankindand Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at pp. 98 -99 .
13. B. L. Whorf, Language, Though and Reality: Selected Writings, (John B. Carroll ed.).
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With the establishment of quantum mechanics, the scientific
community has abandoned the view that the physical world is simply
'out there' waiting for us to notice it in all its plenitude: "no elementary
14
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon."
Time has well passed when it should be recognised that this insight is
doubly true for the social world. Under such a perspective, reality
becomes largely a conventional construct and matter of profound habit.
Of course, we are not free to construct any world at all for the constraints
of our own vulnerability and frailty and the scarcity of different resources
foreclose certain options. But, although any world in which people live is
not objective (in the sense of having a truth value and universal status that
transcends the commitments and interests of its inhabitants), it is not
subjective either (in the sense that each individual is free to sanction or
abandon it as she or he chooses). If the world is not a mirror of our
aspirations, it is not not a mirror either. The world is a communal
property; it belongs to particular people at particular moments in history.
There is no absolute Truth about ourselves and the world. Nor is truth
given over to the private molding of any individual. Knowledge is
ingrained in social life and reinforced in social practice.
In order to understand or make a better world, the task is not to amass
more information; facts are never independent of the theory in which
they achieve their status as facts. What is required is a more appropriate
metaphor and intellectual structure for living. In this way, classification is
a fundamental human activity: "to exist, humanely, is to name the
world." 15 The worth of any scheme of conceptual ordering is not
determined by its degree of fit with a pre-given world nor in terms of
whether it is natural or artificial. Any taxonomic ordering is to be judged
by its capacity to be more or less helpful in making the best of our
personal and collective lives. As such, the art and science of taxonomy for the difference is more a question of style than substance 16 - involves
and can never escape the responsibility to take and defend a moral stance.
Categorisation has, therefore, its own history and politics because the
privilege of naming also carries with it the power to control. Taxonomy
(Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956) at pp. 213-214.
The language of 'dissect' and 'cut up' itself is a very partial way of speaking about the world
and, therefore, of relating to that world.
14. J. Wheeler, "Frontiers of Time" in Problems in the Foundationsof Physics. (Amsterdam;
New York: North Holland Pub. Co., 1979) at p. 198. (Toroldo & Francia eds.). See also, Tribe,
"The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics"
(1989), 103 Harv.L Rev. 1.
15. P. Freire, Pedagogyof the Oppressed (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970) at p. 76.
16. See T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) at p. 343.
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is a major site for the political struggle over the kind of world we want
to live in and classification is the historical manifestation of a contingent
association between interest and perspective. The point of view that
prevails will, at least temporarily, shape and give direction to people's
lives, benefiting some and disadvantaging others. There is no neutral or
uncommitted place on which to stand and name. And there is no neutral
and uncommitted description of the world. The white lines on life's
freeway that guide society into the future are projections of deep-seated
values and silent aspirations. While the taxonomic map is not the social
territory, it is a crucial part of that existential terrain and must be
appreciated as such.
2.

The Language of Law

Language is much more than words and there are many different
languages that we all speak. Language not only consists of a specialised
vocabulary, but a repertoire of argumentative devices and rhetorical
strategies for its deployment; it contains and is comprehended in an
implicit taxonomy of ordering concepts. These discursive practices,
procedures and policies allow people to perceive, understand, act,
criticise, change and disagree in a mutually intelligible manner. By
simultaneously empowering certain modes of action and foreclosing
others, language manages to hold people in a grip that is more powerful
than mere force of arms. 17 Also, there are many languages at work in our
society or, perhaps more accurately, there are many dialects within a
society's language. The dialect of the lawyer is different to that of the
layperson. But the difference is much more significant than their different
idioms and accents. Through their different languages, they inhabit
different worlds; their understanding of the world and their normative
response to it are substantially at odds. Neither is more 'right' or 'wrong'
than the other in absolute terms. However, lawyers are tempted by
professional inclination and social acquiescence to claim an authoritative
status for their language that overwhelms or trivializes other's; lawyers
treat their language as the only language or, at least, the language of
languages.
Legal discourse is a particularly potent tool for negotiating and
constructing social reality. It is one of the ways society defines itself and
presents the world to itself. While the state often relies on crude force or
threats to achieve its ends, the law's strength and long-term viability stems
from its success as a sophisticated mode of ideology. The discursive
17. See Hutchinson, A., "Part of An Essay on Power and Interpretation" (1985), 60 N.YU.L
Rev. 850 at 875-78.
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practices that comprise the language of the law structure the world in
particular and partial ways. Being normative in nature, it operates as a
gatekeeper of the mind which all factual entrants must not only respect
and obey, but which designates them as valid facts in the first place. As
an intelligible description of and mutual prescription for action, legal
discourse pre-disposes its speakers and listeners to certain interpretive
choices and social stances. Located and sustained by historical conditions
and circumstances, the discourse is socially imposed and, what is often
overlooked, unconsciously assumed by its individual users. Indeed, its
efficacy is attributable to its achievement of an ostensibly robust,
plausibly coherent and functionally dependable image of social life and
control.
More than most languages and taxonomic structures, law has managed
to suppress the contingent character of social history. By institutionalizing
an entrenched set of social values, legal discourse and classification has
succeeded, at least partially, to contain the dynamism of history-making
and, in the process, has persuaded people of the 'naturalness' and
'necessity' of current legal constructs which transform as they represent
social arrangements. However, while the intellectual categories and
rhetorical tropes of legal discourse do provide a minimally operative
image of the world, it is so fragile and shallow that it can offer no real
conceptual comfort or repose from the continuing history of political
struggle: "law is a reiterated failure to classify life."' 8 Its prime function
is to paper over the endemic cracks and contradictions of contemporary
life. Consequently, its authority and appeal as a privileged and heeded
voice of society is illusory. The taxonomic categories of the law are
neither determinate nor dispositive. Although they do not sanction and
produce a detailed set of social prescriptions and consequences, they do
stake out the venue, weapons and strategies for political struggle. As such,
law is a formidable obstacle to any real social change; the way people
think about themselves and their limitations is an integral component of
any engaged attempt to change the world.
III. A Tale of Two Cases
1. The Legal Wager
As language-users, people are unwitting gamblers in life. They make a
critical wager: in return for the privilege of living in any world, they are
committed to living in one particular world. The nature of that world will
depend on the language spoken for each language consists of a whole
18. Milsom, "A Pageant in Modem Dress" (1975), 84 Yale L

1585.
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package of foundational beliefs and assumptions about reality and the
individual's place within it. Linguistic concepts are not terms through
which to view and describe an independent reality, but actually constitute
that reality. By using a language, its unspoken values and commitments
are heard and accepted. As Umberto Eco puts it, "the subject is spoken
by language." 1 9 Under the hard shell of language, there is a soft
ideological underbelly. It is not a dessicated husk, but a throbbing and
powerful kernel of life:
For with names the world was called
Out of the empty air,
With names was built and walled,
Line and circle and square,
Dust and emerald,
Snatched from deceiving death,
By the articulate breath. 20
The staple feature of modern legal language is rights-talk. 21 The law
insists on characterizing and categorizing social interaction as occasions
for the exercise or breach of legal rights. When individuals charge
another "You have breached the contract", they have forced their
dealings into a particular linguistic and, therefore, ideological straitjacket: they have entered the world of contractual rights and obligations.
By speaking in that way, they have adopted a very partial idiom and have
set aside other ways of describing their shared experience. For example,
the sterile and impersonal style of rights ignores the understanding of the
event as an immediate inter-personal act of shared trust and commitment
or as an honourable undertaking. They have given abstract rights-talk an
objective existence, treated it as a thing to be grasped and wielded.
Moreover, they have brought into play a whole paraphernalia of
expectations about their future dealings together. In effect, they have had
created for them a distinct past and future scenario for their experience.
Discourse has worked a practical and significant exercise of power. By
filtering it through the sieve of abstract rights-talk, a rich and complex
experience has been diluted and sanitized.
Rationalised by academic scholarship and reinforced by legal
education, 22 the law divides social activity into a variety of doctrinal
19. U. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984) at p. 45.

20. E. Muir, Animals. Collected Poems 1921-58 (London; Faber and Faber, 1960).
21. See Hutchinson and Monahan, "The 'Rights' Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond" (1984),
62 TexasL Rev. 1477 at 1479-91.
22. This structuring begins even before law school starts. Although they might not appreciate
its import, readers of law school brochures are informed that law divides the world into
property, torts, contract, etc.
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categories and develops different principles to understand and evaluate
that categorised activity. Although borne of historical expediency, these
categories are permitted to take on a life of their own and, like
Frankenstein's monster, begin to control as much as be controlled by
their creators. Unlike 'scientific' behaviour, social activity responds to
these conceptual characterisations and begins to reorganise and
reproduce itself in accordance with its informing taxonomic structure.
This gives the process a degree of self-fulfilling coherence and plausibility.
But this apparent rationality is only paper-thin and, when push comes to
shove, the whole doctrinal edifice starts to collapse under the weight of
23
its contradictions.
This fragility is especially evident along the edges of the different
doctrinal categories; taxonomic borders are fuzzy and places of
intellectual danger. These difficulties are not confined to these penumbral
regions, but pervade legal discourse and become egregious at the
doctrinal limits. A topical example is the interaction between 'contract'
and 'tort', in particular the rules governing liability for the negligent
infliction of economic loss where there is no physical injury or property
damage. In short, should Mrs. Donoghue be able to recover the
diminished value of the offending ginger-beer bottle? Anglo-Canadian
courts seem to have gone every which way on this question. 24 The main
contending argument is that there is no principled distinction between
economic loss consequent on physical damage and that which is not.
However, to allow recovery for such loss would be to place a plaintiff in
as good or better position than those who have a contract with the
defendant. Such claims bring into question the whole doctrinal basis for
distinguishing between contractual and tortious liability and reveal a
distinction that even traditional critics consider invidious, arbitrary and

23. For an extended account of this critique, see Hutchinson, "The Rise and Ruse of
Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985), 48 Modern L Rev. 198 and "Mice Under a
Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State" (1989), 41 U. Tor. LJ (forthcoming)
24. See Cohen, "Bleeding Hearts and Peeling Floors: Compensation for Economic Loss at the
House of Lords" (1984), 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 289. An economic loss case which dramatically
illustrates the collapse of contract and tort categories is B.D.C.Ltd v. HofstrandFarmsLimited
and'R. in the Right of British Columbia [1986] 3 W.WR. 216 (S.C.C.). In the future, it can
only be hoped that the Supreme Court will be able to recognize the artificiality of the legal
world they have created in talking about the tort/contract conflict presented in the economic
loss cases. Recent decisions in England indicate that the judges there have retreated from the
expansive approach which some have interpreted them to be taking. See Tate & Lyle Food
Distribution v. GreaterLondon Counci [1983] 2 A.C. 509 (H.L.); Candlewood Navigation

Corporation Ltd v. Mitsui OSK Lines, [1985] 2 All ER 935, [1985] 3 WLR 381 (PC);
Muirhead v. IndustrialTank at Specialities Ltd and Others, [1985] 3 All ER 705, [1985] 3

WLR 993 (CA).

32 The Dalhousie Law Journal

illogical. 25 In a rare moment of candid criticism, Lord Roskill brings to
light, intentionally or otherwise, the deeper jurisprudential issue:
I think today the proper control lies not in asking whether the proper
remedy should lie in contract or ... tort, not in somewhat capricious

judicial determination whether a particular case falls on one side of the
line or the other, not in somewhat artificial distinctions between physical
and economic or financial loss when the two sometimes go together and
sometimes do not ... , but in the first instance in establishing the relevant
principles and then in deciding whether the particular case falls within or

without those principles. 26

Even the partial enlightenment of Lord Roskill is sadly lacking at the
Supreme Court of Canada; its absence is voluble. If recent events are
harbingers of the future, law in Canada is likely to remain as outmoded
as its formal trappings.
At the heart of the legal enterprise is a taxonomic structure that does
not simply offer the lawyer a way to organise and look at the world, but
brings into existence a world and a way of experiencing that world. It is
all the more powerful in its effects and infiltration because of its ability to
persuade its holders of its status as a natural representation, not a
dynamic creation, of an existing world. Through training and interest, the
taxonomy of law has become first-nature to most lawyers. This renders
it almost invisible to them and, therefore, largely immune from critical
appraisal. Accordingly, the task of this article is to bring that taxonomy
to visible attention and put it under critical scrutiny. The ambition is to
demonstrate the politics of the taxonomic structure at work in one
particular region of the law and to suggest ways to revise it in line with
more helpful visions of the good life - to paint some fresh white lines
and to direct the freeway along a different route.
2. A Man of Property
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada illustrate the
importance and force of the legal taxonomy which installs law's world
and structures the resolution of disputes within it. On April 4, 1985, the
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Lapierre v. AttorneyGeneral of Quebec;27 Nathalie Lapierre had sought compensation for
25. See A. M. Tettenborn, An Introduction to the Law of Obligations. (London; Toronto:
Butterworths, 1984).
26. Junior Books Ltd v. Veitchi Co. Ltd., [1983] 1 A.C. 520 at 545 (HL). These words, of

course, offer only a very illusory critique, for Lord Roskill implies the existence of some level
of fixed and fixable principles that can be resorted to to resolve the dispute. Like Ronald
Dworkin, he only 'solves' the problem by hiding it at a higher level of abstraction; see
Dworkin, R., Law's Empire. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986).
27. (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 554, (S.C.C.) dismissing an appeal from the Quebec Court of
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personal injuries which she had suffered as a result of a publically funded
vaccination program organized by the Quebec government. Thirty-five
days later, on May 9, 1985, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for
compensation in The Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener et at1"2
David Tener had claimed compensation for economic losses incurred as
a result of the implementation of a provincial parks program by the
British Columbia government. Whereas Lapierre was perceived to be a
'torts' case, Tener was perceived to be a 'property' case. Those taxonomic
intuitions and perceptions - the way the questions were asked and the
issues framed - to a large extent determined the outcomes in each case.
There were four possible outcomes to Tener and Lapierre:both could
have won; both could have lost; Nathalie could have won and Tener
could have lost; and Nathalie could have lost and Tener could have won.
While there is no uncontroversial ordering of these outcomes that would
garner unanimous approval, it would seem that, outside of the world of
legal doctrine, most people would consider the fourth outcome to be the
most horrific. Few would be prepared to argue ab initio that Tener's
property is more deserving of protection and compensation than
Nathalie's life. Indeed, notwithstanding the judgments, most people
would more than likely subscribe to the opposite view. But this fourth
outcome is exactly what prevailed in Tener and Lapierre.
Although the values that motivated and informed the decisions are
obvious enough, it will be necessary to explain later the values which
underlie the decisions. But what is initially remarkable, however, is that
neither Mr. Justice Chouinard in Lapierrenor Mr. Justice Estey in Tener
had an inkling that the cases raised much the same issues and problems.
Neither judgment refers to the other. Neither judgment alludes to the
need for a common underlying justification for state action and
accountability in the cases. And neither judgment recognizes openly that
the central conundrum in the cases is the extent of social responsibility for
the welfare of others. Of course, it would be naive and disingenuous to
maintain there is a judicial conspiracy of silence at work; nothing suggests
that there was a studied ignorance of the normative similarities nor that
an overt manipulation of doctrinal structures and arguments to achieve
desired outcomes occurred. Nonetheless, the contiguity of Lapierre and
Tener is a stark example of the tenacity and force of taxonomic
structures, their hidden values and their insidious operation.
Appeal, 7 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 27 C.C.L.T. 190, which haa allowed an appeal from the Quebec
Superior Court, [1979] Quebec S.C. 907, 13 C.C.L.T 1.
28. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (S.C.C.) dismissing an appeal from the British Columbia Court
of Appeal, 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168, [1982] 3 WWR. 214, which had allowed an appeal from the
British Columbia Supreme Court, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 728.
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In 1973, as Mr. Justice Lambert put it, "mining in parks was a difficult
political issue". 29 On April 18, 1973 Royal Assent was given to an
amendment to the MineralAc4 which required any individual exploring
for or producing minerals in a British Columbia provincial park to
receive prior Cabinet authorization.3 0 On the same day, Royal Assent
was given to an amendment to the Park Act This Act reclassified Wells
Gray Park as a Class A park and preserved its natural resources until a
park use permit was issued by the government. Furthermore, no permit
could be issued unless it was "necessary to the preservation or
maintenance of the recreational values of the park". 31 David Tener had
invested considerable sums in the preliminary development of certain
mineral resources which he and others owned in the park. From 1973
until 1977, he engaged in several unsuccessful attempts to obtain the
necessary government authorizations to mine and exploit the area.
Finally, frustrated with five years of what he considered to be
bureaucratic obduracy, he sued the British Columbia government. He
claimed compensation for the capital value of the mineral resources, his
wasted expenditures and his anticipated profits from the exploitation of
the mining claims.
The basis of Tener's claim was that the Province had expropriated his
property and that compensation was payable under the applicable
provincial legislation.3 2 Alternatively, he argued that his property was
injuriously affected by the creation of the park and that compensation
was payable under the Land Clauses Act At trial, Mr. Justice Rae held
that the claim for injurious affection failed since the provincial legislation
applicable in expropriation cases constituted a "complete code" of
compensatory entitlements. He maintained that the denial of a permit did
not constitute an expropriation of property since Tener continued to own
the mineral resources; that their economic value had been reduced
considerably was irrelevant. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
Mr. Justice Lambert agreed, if for different reasons, that no expropriation
had taken place. Nonetheless, he awarded compensation to Tener for
injurious affection under the Land ClausesAct 33 -e interpreted the Park
Act and the Ministry of Highwaysand Public Works Act as permitting the
29. 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168 at 173.
30. An Act to Amend the MineralAc4 S.B.C. 1973, c.52, s.9.
31. An ActAmend the Park Ac4 S.B.C. 1973, c.67, s.3.
32. ParkAc4 S.B.C. 1965, as amended 1977, c.75, and The Ministry of Highways and Public
Works Ac4 R.S.B.C. 1960, c.109, s.15 (as amended), now The Ministry of Transportationand
Highway Ac4 R.S.B.C. 1970, c.280.
33. Mr. Justice Lambert focussed on his perception that the Crown did not acquire rights in
or to property, and thus that there had been no 'taking'. Supra, note 27 at 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168
at 180 (B.C.C.A.).
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operation of the Land Clauses Act where injurious affection, in the
absence of expropriation, had occurred. While he justified his conclusion
through several arguments, he placed emphasis on the principle that
compensatory claims should be resolved in favour of the claimant when
a person's property had been "injuriously affected by an enterprise
carried out by the Crown for the benefit of the public".34 Finally, he held,
in a remarkably revisionist exercise of case analysis, that the denial of a
permit could constitute injurious affection notwithstanding that there was
no physical invasion of the land itself, no physical obstruction of access
35
and no unlawful act rendered lawful by statutory powers.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Estey delivered the
majority judgment. He supported Tener's proposition that a property
right included a right to minerals as well as a right of access necessary for
their development. The focus and definition of the property right allowed
him to invoke a remarkable nineteenth century interpretive fiction that "a
statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject
without compensation"; this is based on the political belief that
deprivation of property rights associated with state action should be
shared by the community. 36 He also held, as he was forced to by the logic
of the 'property structure', that the denial of access to the mineral
resources constituted a recovery of part of the rights granted by the
Crown in 1937 and that a "taking" occurred because the value of a state
asset - the park - was enhanced. Madam Justice Wilson followed a
similar course of argument and insisted that "the vice aimed at is
expropriation without compensation". 37 In her view, the denial of the
access permit deprived Tener of his profit a prendre and constituted a
taking since the deprivation effectively resulted in the Crown removing
an encumbrance from its own property. In short, Tener's loss was the
Crown's gain. With a tragic sense of irony, she stated that "it would, in
my view, be quite unconscionable to say that this cannot constitute an
38
expropriation in some technical, legalistic sense".
While the conflict between Tener and the state could have been
interpreted as a story about what we wish to do and what we can do

34. 133 D.L.R. (3d) 168 at 178.
35. See Todd, "The Mystique of Injurious Affection in the Law of Expropriation" (1967),
UBC.L Rev. 127.
36. Attorney-General v. De Keyser's RoyalHotel Ltd., 1920] A.C. 508 at 542. (H.L.(E.))
37. (1985) 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 23. (S.C.C.) We do not know what Wilson J. meant by 'vice',
but the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines it as a "habit or a practice of an immoral,
degrading or wicked nature," or "a moral fault or defect (without implication of serious wrongdoing)".
38. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 25. (S.C.C.)
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when one person's welfare has been diminished as a result of government
action to benefit the community, that is not the way the judgments read.
The formalistic and analytical framework applied to the reality
constructed by the judges transforms that idea (if it ever existed in the
minds of the judges) into a claim for compensation on an expropriation
of property. Attention is thus focused on historical legal concepts of
property, on the formal requirements of a taking, and the interpretation
of common law and statutory rights of compensation which 'exist'. In an
important sense, all of the judgments operate at this level. Given the preunderstanding of the judges and the internalized structure of law, the
judicial exercise is to define property, establish its taking and interpret the
relevant legislation and common law cases to provide a right to
compensation. The result is presented as flowing inexorably from the
initial perception of Tener's welfare as a property right.
3. A Child of Tort
The courts' initial perception of Lapierrewas radically different. If Tener
was a 'property' case, Lapierre was a 'torts' case. On September 14,
1972, Nathalie Lapierre, then five years old, received an inoculation of a
measles vaccine as part of a mass inoculation program which the
Province of Quebec had organized. Within a week, Nathalie began
exhibiting symptoms consistent with acute viral hepatitis. She was
admitted to hospital and consequently the illness had "entrainer son
incapacite permanente quasi totale". 39 Her father sued the Quebec
government so that Nathalie might be able to receive special educational
and social care for the rest of her 'life'. The Lapierres were successful at
trial and were awarded $375,000.
Lapierre would likely be classified as a 'tort' case in common law
provinces.40 In Quebec, the case was argued within the context of two

39. (1980) 13 C.C.L.T I at 8 (Quebec Superior Court).
40. The categorization would probably have resulted in the dismissal of the law suit for several
reasons. First, judicial attitudes towards strict products liability and design defects suggest that
the judges would have demanded a demonstration of governmental negligence as a precondition of liability. Second, the decision to implement a mass innoculation program with
concomitant risks of personal injury would almost certainly have been labelled a 'policy'
decision and thus beyond judicial review. Finally, the provincial crown proceedings legislation
almost uniformly predicate vicarious state liability on the demonstration of a common law tort
committed by a particular civil servant. Of course, we recognize that potential tort liability can
be articulated using common law concepts. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,498 F2d 1264
(1974), (United States C,A,); Petty v. United States, 740 E2d 1428 (1984). In Petty, the
plaintiff recovered compensation under the Swine Flu Act, 28 U.S.C.A. ss.1346(b),
2671-2680, under which the United States was derivatively liable for the drug manufacturer's
liability as well as directly liable for its own negligence.
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sections of the Code Civil. Article 1053 imposes liability in the event of

fault and Article 1057 imposes liability when the defendant's act 4is
motivated by an (un)fortuitous event, namely a measles epidemic. '
Article 1057 is admittedly drafted in language capable of a range of

interpretations. It had been used in earlier cases to indemnify individuals
whose property had been damaged by government acting to benefit the
community. At trial, Mr. Justice Nadeau held that Article 1057 could be
applied where a fortuitous event (a measles epidemic) resulted in a
deliberate act by the government (the establishment of a mass inoculation

program), even if implemented after an accurate risk/benefit analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the government's appeal. 42 It chose to
interpret Article 1057 to apply only to obligations imposed independently under other Code or statutory provisions. In the absence of a
specific immunization liability section, Article 1057 could not be used to

impose liability. The formal analysis reflected in statements that "the
courts can only apply law as it exists" 43 apparently overwhelmed
sentiments that compensation would have been a better result.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was given by Mr.
Justice Chouinard. Affirming the Court of Appeal decision, he expressed
his sympathy for Nathalie, but little else. In legal terms, his judgment is
long on authority, but short on analysis. First, he distinguished on formal
grounds cases like Quebec v. Mahoney," Dalbec v. Montreal45 and
Guardian Insurance Co. v. Chicoutimi" in which compensation was

awarded when private homes were damaged or property revenues were
diminished by state action. He characterized them as instances of 'tacit'
expropriation; Lapierre was seemingly not amenable to such
characterization. Second, he refused to develop a general theory of equal
41. We recognize that Canadian law is characterized by two primary ideas - civil law and
common law. The structure of law in each province thus compels very different intellectual
exercises before we even begin to understand the Lapierreand Tener cases. Nevertheless, the
civil structure of Quebec law and the common structure of British Columbia law do not
determine the outcome of these cases. First, the trial judge in Lapierre,working within the
structure of the Code Civil, could and did provide compensation to Nathalie. French judges in
the early 1960s did the same in France. Second, the civilian structure is not monolithic and
different judges internalize it to different extents. Common law language and thought, as
exhibited in Tener, is also not determinative. Again, in Tener, the trial judge could and did
deny compensation. As well, Tener reflects the interpretation of ambiguously worded
collections of statutes - and it is fair to say, as the Supreme Court of Canada did, that the
internalized structure of private property and ideas about the appropriate role of the state and
community were far more important than "technical, legalistic" arguments. See supra,note 42.
42. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 37.
43. Id, at 46.
44. (1901), 10 C.B.R. 378 (K.B.).
45. (1902), 22 C.S. 23 (Superior Court).
46. (1915), 51 S.C.R. 562, 25 D.L.R. 322.

38 The Dalhousie Law Journal

contribution, extrapolated from the Code's theory of general average
contribution. 47 In addition, Chouinard J. refused to construct a theory of
compensation from Article 407 which provides that "No one can be
compelled to give up his property, except for public utility, and in
consideration of a just indemnity previously paid". In light of the striking
similarity between this provision and the doctrinal rhetoric in Tener, the
Court's failure to recognize even the slightest conceptual connection
between Tener and Lapierre testifies to the hold that the legal structures
of thought have over the collective judicial consciousness.
Third, Chouinard J. said that Article 1057 could not be used to impose
liability on the state since the Article did not establish an independent
source of obligation. He did not explain why he took that view of the
world. Nor did he recount why he rejected the final argument of the
plaintiff - that a "theory of risk" could be used to justify an award of
compensation. Lapierres' lawyers had uncovered several French
administrative decisions of the late 1950's and early 1960's which had
awarded compensation to those who had become immunization victims
"as the result of efforts to protect the French public, in a pitiless game of
chance". 48 The French administrative courts had developed the theory of
risk from Rousseauian notions of equality - demanding that individual
sacrifice, even in the public interest, represents "a deliberate breach of the
equality which should apply between citizens with respect to public
burdens, and that equality must be re-established by means of a
compensatory payment. '49 Mr. Justice Chouinard simply chose to ignore
that idea.
4.

A Matterfor Negotiation

The structure of legal taxonomy in Lapierre and Tener can best be
explained by recognizing the intellectual constructs which the judges used
(and were used by) to understand and categorize the social events which
47. This is perhaps an example of the differences in common law and civil law language. Most
lawyers socialized in common law culture will immediately recognize that the idea of
extrapolation used by Lapierre's lawyers is a permissible, indeed a powerful, rhetorical device
in common law language. Cases like Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) and
Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 (C.A.) are famous not for their formal rules, but for
their formal argumentative devices. This occurs in the case of maritime accidents, with the
theory of expenditures in the common interest, as in the case of creditor's insolvency claims,
and with the theory of reimbursement of necessary expenditures, as in the case of property

improvements.
48. R. Savatier, "Responsabilite de 'Etat dans les accidents de vaccination obligatoire
reconnus imparables," Melange offerts a Marcel Waline, t.2 (Paris, 1974) at 752-3, translated

at (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 554 at 574-75.
49. Id at 575.
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led to the two cases. Lapierre was a 'tort' case; a personal injury claim
with no evidence of a deliberate bureaucratic sacrifice of Nathalie's
welfare. Tener was a 'property' case; the devaluation of an economic
resource with considerable evidence of a deliberate executive choice to
sacrifice Tener's property. The way the judges constructed the different
universes of Tener and Lapierre conditioned their whole response to the
claims. Once the cases were identified and located in their doctrinal
categories, all other considerations became irrelevant or, at best marginal.
The operative legal structures were so ingrained that they became a
matter of first-nature to them.
The episodes in Tener and Lapierre are illustrative of how lawyers
(and laypeople) treat the law's conceptual apparatus and discursive
categories as natural and how, in the process, they confer the status of the
real and concrete on the abstract and metaphorical. For instance, when
deciding whether a contract exists between two parties, lawyers speak
and act as if they were looking for a 'contractual thing' in a drawer full
of social events and circumstances. It is assumed that, if all the facts were
known, 'the contract' would somehow body forth and bring the dispute
to a demonstrable close. Yet, as all law students know, a contract is an
idea, not a thing; it is an abstraction. It exists in the realm of metaphysics,
not in the world of physicality; a written contract is not the contract, but
simply evidence of the contract. Similarly, property, does not comprise
the tangible objects in the physical world, but the abstract relation
between such visible effects and people.50
Although born of historical expediency and sustained by political
convenience, legal categories, like contract and property, take on a life of
their own. Unlike the life of the so-called natural world, social activity
responds to these conceptual metaphors and reproduces itself in
accordance with them. Not only does this give the law a patina of
plausibility and coherence, it allows lawyers to refer to 'reality' as
confirmation of the naturalness and inevitability of prevailing legal
structures and its underlying values. The fact that this process occurs
unconsciously makes it no less political and much more effective. The
judges have managed to construct and perpetuate a doctrinal schema that
places property above persons. Whereas the notion of strict liability is
standard in property, losses lie where they fall in tort unless there is a
finding of fault. Through the vehicle of doctrinal principles and

50. See Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am U L Rev. 131 at 157 (property is "a sort
of vector analysis with time coordinates [of a bundle of forces]") and Hohfeld, "Some
Fundamental Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (1913), 23 Yale LJ.16 and
(1917), 26 YaleLJ 710.
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classifications, values of the past are sustained in the present and judges
are able to disclaim responsibility for this state of affairs.
There are two major and related lessons to be learned from the judicial
tandem of Tener and Lapierre- doctrinal indeterminacy and taxonomic
malleability. Even once the situations were recognised as belonging to the
tort and property categories, it is far from self-evident as to what the
correct resolution should be as a matter of legal wisdom. As the varied
judgments from the different levels of courts show, the doctrinal corpus
is sufficiently rich to sustain a range of equally plausible and perfectly
contradictory outcomes. But, for the purposes of this paper, this
phenomenon is not as important as the plasticity of the informing
doctrinal categories.5 The conditions for entry into any doctrinal
category are neither fixed nor certain; they are as open-ended and
malleable as the doctrinal materials within the category itself. Events or
categories can be re-described and re-worked to contain what is presently
considered irrelevant or incompatible.
For instance, an immediate response to Nathalie's dilemma might be
to retain the intellectually comfortable and existentially familiar
structures and simply reclassify Nathalie's body as her property.5 2 Such a
suggestion is hardly radical. John Locke is perhaps the best known of the
"body as property" theorists, writing that "every Man has a Property in
his own Person. Thus no Body has any Right to but himself".53 People
have been treated as property in the past when it has served the purposes
and interests of other dominant persons 4 Although less obviously crass,
the law continues to follow a similar line today in some contexts.5 5 The
inhumanity of treating persons as property can be rejected and
resurrected in the reconceptualization of human rights as property rights.
51. For an extensive development and explanation of doctrinal indeterminacy, see
Hutchinson, "Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation" (1989), 43 U
MiamiL Rev. 541.
52. This idea was developed in a provocative essay in C.B. MacPherson, The Rise and Fallof
Economic Justice and OtherPapers. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). We
recognize, of course, that some judges might reject the 'body as property' thesis. In Loge v. US.
622 E2d 1268 (1978), the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument in the case of a
claim for compensation by a victim of a polio vaccination program.
53. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government Chapter 5 (1690) Locke, J., The Second
Treatise of Government, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). See M.J. Sandel, Liberalism and
the Limits ofJustic (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at p. 116.
54. The language in Bonne v. Eyre (1777), 1 H.BL. 273, 126 E.R. 160 (Court of Common
Pleas) a pre-eminent 'contract' case, which speaks of the lawful possession of negros and of a
negro being the property of the plaintiff, shows how comfortable ideas become to us.
55. The Supreme Court itself in speaking of compensation awards in personal injury cases
talks of "justice and humanity" and compensation for "a reduced capital asset" in the same
breath. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452 at 474-75 per
Dickson J. (S.C.C.).
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Property can be made to mean one's own person, capacities and life.
Thus the choice to protect property from state action becomes a choice
to preserve quality of life and not merely ownership of wealth and
material objects. Individual property in "life, liberty and capacities" is
more egalitarian than the more modem and limited notion of property,
if only because everyone would have the same enforceable claims to their
own selves.
But the recategorization of well-being from rights through quality of
life to property is merely a strategic calculation and simply effects
instrumental restructuring of our thinking. Apart from perpetuating the
dubious provenance of rights-talk, the recognition of the "whole prestige
of property" works against the successful assertions of claims to human
dignity and equality. Accordingly, within existing schemes, Nathalie
Lapierre's protection would require a relabeling of her humanity as a
property right. The worth of such a strategy is hopelessly transparent; the
approach is facile and self-defeating. Shifting Nathalie's welfare into the
'property room' of the taxonomic castle retains and actually strengthens
the existing intellectual structure of legal discourse. Further, such
manoeuvering can bring about only modest improvements in social
welfare. Nathalie Lapierre can obtain compensation within the existing
structure of law, but that would simply be to throw good money after
bad. Reality has not changed, events have not changed, but our
understanding and conceptualization of them has. So has the language we
use to think about them. And that is all that matters.
Thoughts about Nathalie Lapierre need not involve talk of human
welfare as a property right in order to provide her with a better life. In
comparing these ways of retelling Tener and Lapierre, it becomes
apparent that judges, like everyone else, are captives of their own
conscious and unconscious imaginings. The structure of law - the role
of judges and representative institutions; the categorization of events as
property, tort or contract cases; the classification of relationships as
disputes; the application of 'external' sanctions' etc. - is all-embracing.
Yet the cynical recategorization of humanity as 'property' or the marginal
restructuring of law to include 'rational' dialogue about the underlying
values and instrumental effects of our choices do not exhaust the
imaginative limits of the human condition. For instance, within legal
doctrine, there is only the most attenuated discussion of communitarian
values and the different choices they nurture. But it is exactly this kind of
thinking that needs to be explored rather than suppressed - if only as a
counterpoint to the fearful lack of vision in the status quo.
What this article proposes is a recognition of structure - the existing
ideas and language which are used to think about events like David
Tener's economic well-being in British Columbia in 1973 and Nathalie
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Lapierre's physical and emotional well-being in Quebec in 1972. Once
the power of discursive assumptions and taxonomic classifications are
more fully recognised, it might be possible to begin the essential project
of beginning to talk differently. While some discursive commitment is
necessary, no one particular structure is inevitable. There are other
possible ways to think about and engage in the world. While the legal
structures of the conceptual status quo are disciplining, we are not
entirely disciplined; there exists some room for re-negotiation and reconstruction. The remainder of the paper adumbrates some of the
avenues that might be travelled in the journey toward an improved vision
of the legal world.
IV. Alternative A venues
1. Government Liability or Community Responsibility
The questions to be addressed in thinking about "government liability"
for the welfare of individuals and groups in the community are these To what extent, and through what institutional processes, ought the
community to be responsible for the losses suffered by individuals and
groups as a result of state action? How is the institutional competence of
the courts or alternative dispute-resolution agencies to be assessed?
Should responsibility be limited to entitlements to rights to compensation
or should additional community responses be considered? Is the
traditional judicial reluctance to impose positive obligations on private
individuals (reflected in the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy in tort
law) appropriate in the case of governmental action and inaction
liability? How is it to be decided if the state is responsible when it acts
through relatively independent private and corporate agents? What is the
appropriate response to the self-interested acts of public bureaucrats?
When should the activities of decentralized government bodies expose
public funds to liability? What aspects of human welfare should be
protected from state action? Should compensation be limited to
traditional property rights or ought the question to be approached
unconstrained by private law considerations? What are the regulatory
effects on public bureaucracies and private behaviour of alternative
compensation regimes? What is the symbolic role of government
immunity and governmental responsibility? What is the best use to be
made of law's symbolism?
Recent developments in tort law represent a critical shift in the
development of public liability law. In particular, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v. Nielsen56 acknowl56. (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.).
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edges explicitly that government liability for accidents and for deliberate
distributive choices must be thought about in a significantly different
manner than issues of private tort liability. It represents a deliberate
decision by the courts that the regulatory activities of public institutions
should be subject to review consisting of awards of compensation to
adversely affected individuals. This development in tort law gives us
some hope that the reactionary ideology reflected in Tener is not as
pervasive as it might appear.
A critical assessment of the current regime of government liability and
the design of alternatives cannot avoid the intractable, highly contentious,
and overtly political character of the exercise. It speaks to profound
questions about the nature of democratic governance and responsibility.57
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to limit discussion to "public" tort
remedies. Asking such large questions forces an appraisal of the role of
the modem Canadian state and public bureaucrats. In short, there must
be a willingness to tackle the fundamental problem suggested, but
ignored in Tener and Lapierre. And we must ask the ultimate question,
what is the responsibility of some members of the community to others?
In the absence of a social consensus as to the responsibility of the
Canadian community and the role of the state in defining that
responsibility, there must be the same dialogue and resolutions in legal
forums as is required in the political arena. Law must embrace rather
than eschew ideology; the choice is only between candour and
subterfuge.
Tort law is one legal concept, along with promise (contract) and
ownership (property), which can be used to define the scope of
permissible conduct and to justify the imposition of obligations on private
actors for the losses which their activities impose on others. It is extraordinarily broad in scope and encompasses, at least in theory, the entire
range of human activities and interests. It is also the vehicle which has
been chosen to impose liability on the state through the crown liability
legislation. Accordingly, focusing on tort law in state liability cases signals
the implicit adoption of a particular set of normative presuppositions.
While it might be concluded that it is appropriate to apply private law
concepts of tort to the state, beginning an enquiry with that assumption
is very troublesome and likely dangerous.
There are, of course, an infinite number of alternative liability regimes
which might be considered in thinking about these questions and in
particular, about how to respond to Tener and Lapierre. It is useful to
keep in mind several of the more obvious choices. First, there is a "no
57. Schuck, R,Suing GovernmenL (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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liability" regime under which no claims to compensation either against
the state or against individual public bureaucrats would be recognized.
This represents the political ideology of a totalitarian state - with no
individual or group interests being respected under any circumstances in
respect of the acts of a particular sub-group who can organize and
mobilize force. The only constraint or response to state action in such a
world would be an opposing source of violence. While it might constrain
those who enjoy the legal authority to exercise force for the time being,
it cannot realistically be conceived of as a compensation or regulatory
system.
Second, a "no liability" regime might be coupled with a comprehensive or limited compensation system. This could be funded out of general
revenues or through an insurance system which would necessarily
include a specific fee generating process. For example, one response to
individual welfare losses resulting from governmental or community
action is legislation mandating compensation for vaccine injuries which
exists in the United States and has been proposed in Canada. 58 For
example, it can be asked whether compensation rights which provide a
patchwork of entitlements and are largely self-enforcing might be
replaced by a comprehensive public compensation program; this would
provide for the provision of services or money on the complainant's
demonstration of a casual relationship between a private injury and
government action. Such a definition, however, is far too simplistic. In
designing such a program, it is necessary to decide which interests are
compensable, define the amount of compensation, list the circumstances
under which the "government action" criteria for compensation would
be met, 9 concede that determinations of causation would incorporate
normative choice, and provide an institutional infra-structure for
implementing and administering the compensation system. The basic

58. See "Canada eyes compensation plan for vaccine injuries", The MedicalPos4 December
9, 1986 at 39; McIntosh, "Liability and Compensation Aspects of Immunization Injury: A Call
for Reform" (1980), 18 Osg. Hal L. 584; Reitze, "Federal Compensation for Vaccination
Induced Injuries" (1986), 13 BosL CoIL Environ. Aff. Law Rev. 169. But even equating
compensation only with financial reparation can often represent a choice to maintain the
existing distribution of wealth and work to isolate the injured person from their community.
See Hutchinson, supra, note 5 at ch. 10.
59. This would mean cletining and distinguishing between action and inaction. This is an
horrendously complex task. See Hutchinson and Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The
Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988), 38 U. Tor. LJ 278. As well, if one chose to limit
compensation to cases of losses associated with government action, one would have had to
justify the implicit, conservative/libertarian philosophy to preserve the status quo by
predicating compensation on cases of state action making the complainant worse off than she
was prior to the alleged wrong.
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point, of course, is that the development of social welfare and insurance
programs has made it impossible to think of liability regimes as a purely
"private law" matter.
A third possible way of thinking about Tener and Lapierreis to treat
the state like a private firm where claims are made in tort, contract and
property. This was the implicit model relied on by the Supreme Court in
both these cases, and with limited exceptions, it represents the liability
regime operating in Canada since 1953. 60 Virtually every agency which
has studied government liability has proposed that the Crown be treated
"as nearly as possible" as a private individual. 6' It is also the favourite of

conservative academics. Their Diceyian thinking is threefold: that public
bureaucrats ought not to enjoy any special privileges and must be subject
to the same law as private persons; that the civil compensation system
should not recognize anything more than common law entitlements; and
that unarticulated judicial values which inhere in private law concepts

60. Of course, property claims were compensated prior to 1953 and restitutionary claims were
recognized as well. Nonetheless, there was no general regime of liability applicable against the
federal government prior to the enactment of the Crown Liability Act S.C. 1952-53, c. 30.
There had, however, been several incremental attempts to expand the liability of the
government in tort beginning with An Act Respecting OfficialArbitrators,S.C. 1886, c. 40, s.
6, and ending in 1938 with an amendment to the Exchequer Court Ac4 R.S.C. 1927, c. 34,
s. 19(c).
It is the model currently adopted in all provincial and federal crown liability legislation and
in most English speaking countries after the Second World War. For example the American
FederalTort Claims Act 1947, provides that the federal government in the United States is
liable for torts "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances", incorporating the relevant state law applicable to the plaintiff's claim. In New
Zealand, the Crown ProceedingsAc enacted in 1950 is modelled on the comparable English
legislation of 1947. Both statutes impose vicarious liability on the Crown for the common law
torts of civil servants.
61. See Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Report on Proceedings by and
Against the Crown 13 (1975). The Law Reform Commission considered that an analysis and
evaluation of each specific Crown privilege presented an insurmountable task, and thus
proposed that:
claims against the Crown [should be] as justiciable as claims against the subject, leaving
it to the courts to resolve by judicial determination such particular difficulties as may
occasionally arise from the fact that the role of the Crown may be special.
The British Columbia Law Reform Commission made the identical recommendation
several years earlier in its Report on Civil Rights, Part L Legal Position of the Crown, (LRC
9, 1972). The result was the enactment of the Crown ProceedingAc R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 86,
section 2(c) of which provides that "the Crown is subject to all those liabilities to which it
would be liable if it were a person". There have been no empirical studies in either jurisdiction
which reveal the impact of such dramatic reforms. Recently, the New Zealand Public and
Administrative Law Reform Committee in its Report on Damages in Administrative Law
(1980) recommended the enactment of a provision which would make the Crown "subject to
all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would
be subject."
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like 'reasonableness' are sufficiently flexible to permit them to be used in
62
the context of public liability.
A fourth possibility would be a unified and comprehensive public
liability regime which would be applied specifically to state actions and
to state activities. This would differ in a number of respects from the
liability regime applied to private firms. 63 Issues such as strict liability or
fault, compensation for pain and suffering, excuses relating to statutory
authority and the like could be grafted on to the system without
replicating the detailed solutions arrived at in the law of torts. 64 While
courts might be retained as the institutional mechanism to give effect to
this substantive liability regime, they could also be replaced with an
alternative review institution, like the ombudsman.
Finally, and fifth, a government liability regime might consist of a
melange of the previous proposals. This would demand an assessment of
the range of claims to compensation made in connection with different
regulatory activities, would involve the creation of a number of different
liability, insurance or compensation systems which would be sensitive to
the particular bureaucratic activity which generated the injury, would
reflect a consideration of the private interests recognized in each case,
would take into account the regulatory impact of the compensation/
liability regime on bureaucratic behaviour, and so on.
2. Toward CommunalResponsibility
Any choice between and among these alternative regimes necessarily
involves the development of a model of community action and
responsibility. In determining the possible liability of government to
private individuals and firms, a number of normative assumptions central
to an understanding of the concept of government liability can be
identified. These norms permit an explanation and evaluation of
"government liability". Only after completing that exercise will it be
possible to understand how we should think about cases like Tener and

62. See Bailey and Bowman, "The Policy/Operational Dichotomy - A Cuckoo in the Nest"
(1986), 45 Camb. LJ 430.
63. This approach was rejected at least in part by the New Zealand Public and Administrative
Law Reform Committee, supra, note 61.

64. One idea of a public liability regime might be represented by the recognition of a general
right of recovery of compensation for "unlawful" or "unauthorized" administrative action.
However, concerns with the current conclusory analysis and manipulation of jurisdictional
errors in administrative law, with an inability to distinguish between egregious and trivial
errors, with the potential for judicial interference with bureaucratic discretion, and with the

demonstrable plaintiff bias inherent in the recommendation, can easily be offered in support of
rejecting such a proposal. See J. Evans, De Smith's "Judicial Review of Administrative
Action" (3rd ed. 1983).
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Lapierre that is appropriate to the prevailing institutional milieu and
ideological climate in Canada.
Such a project must commence from the understanding that law is
inescapably normative; any liability regime comprises a public expression
and embodiment of deep-seated beliefs about communal ethics. A central
and informing belief of our analysis is that the institutions of private law
contain a set of normative and political ideas that are inimical to a
humane and progressive response to human suffering and losses. The
current liability regime reflected in Tener and Lapierre reflects a set of
normative presuppositions which are not difficult to identify. It expresses
the lingering values of a narrow political strategy that bears the imprint
of late nineteenth century thinking in England. It is an ideology that has
little relation to the pluralism which characterizes the modem Canadian
state. 65 As such, it becomes incumbent on any advocate of reform to
articulate the values which inhere in or are aspired to by any particular
society and, in light of those normative commitments, propose a scheme
for communal assistance and care.
The most disturbing characteristics of the liability regime reflected in
Tener v. Lapierre are the retention of personal bureaucratic legal
responsibility for common law torts, the imposition of vicarious liability
on the Crown, and the denial, with few exceptions, of direct obligations
by the Canadian community to its members. The choice of personal
bureaucratic liability maximizes the deterrent effect of legal rules on the
behaviour of bureaucrats and can be perceived as an expression of the
political ideology of the Rule of Law. The retention of personal
bureaucratic liability is a decision which denies public civil servants any
immunities based simply on their status as public bureaucrats and creates
incentives for bureaucratic conservatism."s Moreover, using the common
law of torts as the touchstone of liability means that only those interests
protected by the judiciary in relations between private persons will be
recognized in relations between individuals, the community and the state.
The reliance on 'corrective justice' models of law-making, in defining
relations between individuals, not only ignores the instrumental and
65. See L. Panitch, The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977). Arthurs, H.W, "Without the Law" Administrative Justice
and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-CenturyEngland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985).
66. Justification for their activity must be found in legislation and the interpretive rules used
to articulate that justification are themselves based on anti-legislative biases. These include
implied rights of compensation in the case of property rights, implied terms that state action
will take place without negligence, and interpretive rules which preserve judicially defined
common law entitlements unless expressly abrogated. See Cohen, D., Accident Compensation
and the State, forthcoming Ch4.
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social-ordering ideas commonly associated with legal decision-making,
but also reflects a conservative ideology which denies the existence of the
state or community in cases like Tener and Lapierre. The idea of
corrective justice asks only that it be determined whether a person has
unlawfully caused an injury to another. If the answer to that question is
in the affirmative, the injurer is required to restore the victim to the
position she was in prior to the wrongful interference with her rights.
Whatever merits corrective justice - the restoration of the status quo
where the complainant demonstrates that the defendant has wrongfully
interfered with her entitlements - has in defining and legitimizing
private relations, 67 it has only the most limited pertinence to stateindividual relations. It presumes that the two parties are equal in all
respects and that it is already known what entitlements ought to be
recognized in the case of state action. In short, proponents of corrective
justice beg the very question to be answered - what elements of human
68
welfare ought to be protected?
Being inherently ahistorical and asocial in its construction and
application, a model of corrective justice is ill-suited to the existence and
commitments of the modern activist welfare state in Canada. Corrective
justice ignores the legitimacy of collective action through public
bureaucracies. To contend that the protection of individual rights always
demands government liability is to maintain that government ought to be
constrained from acting and that individual economic welfare as defined
by judges must always prevail over the collective good. At the very least,
any model of government liability must acknowledge and struggle with
the inherent tension between individual rights and the collectivity. While
a final resolution is unlikely, its continued presence transforms this
acknowledgement and struggle into a fundamental matter.
In contrast to such traditional models, very different values are
expressed in alternative models of public compensation law. The idea of
equal treatment has been recognized as a normative foundation of public
liability in civilian jurisdictions. In France, for example, the Conseil
d'Etat will order compensation from the government when one person
has been forced to bear a disproportionate share of the costs associated
with public activities. The English courts have also justified compensation on equal treatment grounds, but the justification has been limited to
"takings" of property.

67. See A. Linden, Canadian Tort Law 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at pp. 3-5.
68. For an elaborate defence of 'corrective justice' see Weinrib, "Legal Formalism, On the
Immanent Rationality of Law" (1988), 97 Yale Law Journal949.
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A different perspective points to the interaction of government liability
and the modem redistributive state. Judges have, if somewhat belatedly,
realized that in imposing liability on the state they are in effect
(re)allocating public resources. Similarly, judges have attempted to
exempt so-called 'policy' decisions from judicial review; this
categorization has been justified in part on their self-confessed inability to
develop legitimate grounds for the distribution of public resources in a
different way than that originally chosen by elected officials and
accountable bureaucrats. 69 All responses to state action must recognize
the political status of the defendant and the legitimacy of redistributive
decisions which adversely affect the welfare of private citizens. While
many, including judges, might disagree with the redistributive policies of
any particular government, it is inconceivable that a "distributive
judgement review tribunal" could be established which would have
greater political legitimacy than the current representative institution.
Any liability regime must defer to and complement, rather than subvert
and stymie, the distributive policies and choices made by the democratic
institutions of the state.
A related normative idea in responding to state action is an
appreciation of the development of communities and vehicles to ensure
and facilitate sharing. One of the most powerful ideas describing social
organization is that of the community as a form of social ordering
through which its members can participate in sharing the losses
experienced by others: people are interconnected and interdependent. We
can exist as individuals, and achieve our potential as autonomous beings,
only if there is a social community in which we participate. We live
together in part because we can assist one another when we suffer losses
as a result of events over which we have little or no control. 70 It finds

69. See Cleveland-Clifs Steamships Co. and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. The Queen (1957),
10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at 679-80 (S.C.C.); Barrattv. District of North Vancouver (1980), 114
D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.). This is one of the ideas reflected in Welbridge Holdings Ltd v.
MetropolitanCorp of Greater Winnipeg; [1971] S.C.R. 957. Where the Supreme Court refused
to impose liability for unauthorized legislative acts. Finally, this is the rationale for section 3(8)
of the Federal Crown Liability Act which excludes from tort liability all bureaucratic activities
carried out pursuant to statutory power or authority. However, the courts have interpreted this
provision restrictively, stating that there is a presumption against statutory powers authorizing
acts which would be tortious at common law. Only if the injury is an "inevitable" consequence
of the exercise of statutory powers will the Crown escape liability. Similarly, section 6 of the
Act suggests that the introduction of legislation will not give rise to liability.
70. This notion of community and of individual responsibility for the welfare of others is
recognized in Article 13 of the Declarationof the Rights of Man, 1789 which states that "For
the maintenance of the forces of law and order and for the expenses of administration a general
contribution is indispensable; it must be equally shared among citizens according to their
means."
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expression in decisions like Tener providing compensation when state
action results in losses to property owners but not, apparently in cases like
Lapierre when public health measures result in injury to children as a
necessary consequence of immunization programmes. The community
benefits as a result of the individual's sacrifice and egalitarian ideals
suggest that the loss should be shared equally.
All of these ideas can be expressed under the rubric of compensation
rather than deterrence or justice as the fundamental value underlying an
appropriate response to cases like Tener and Lapierre.Most tort theorists
recognize the role of compensation, regulatory deterrence 7' and
corrective justice72 in private tort law. Yet notions of regulatory
deterrence and corrective justice are not simply transposed to "public"
liability. The unique political, economic, and bureaucratic characteristics
of the state suggest that thinking about government liability requires a
more sensitive and sophisticated approach to the nature of the state. The
ineffectiveness of tort law as a regulatory instrument and the prevailing
ideals of social justice compel the selection of compensation as the
primary object of a "liability regime" which responds to the injurycausing behaviour of public institutions.
It is commonly argued that "the notion of comparative utility suggests
that the aggregate utility of a group of individuals may be increased by
taking a small amount of goods and services from all individuals to
compensate an injured individual". 73 This is one element in reducing the
consequences of losses which occur in society; the consequences of
accidents which do occur can be reduced through loss shifting
arrangements. 74 In this model, compensation represents a mechanism
whereby collective groups can 'bribe' victims of collective action. In these
circumstances, the role of the state is to minimize the transaction costs

71. This is the model which finds expression in the law and economics literature, "One of the
main purposes of law, from an economic standpoint, is the control of externalities ...
[Lliability rules... are devices by which people are given incentives to internalize the costs and
benefits of their actions so that an efficient allocation of resources is achieved". Posner, "Some
Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law" (1979), 46 U Chi L Rev. 281 at 305.
72. This is the traditional view which still holds in the minds of most Canadian judges,
academics and lawyers. The law of torts is seen as a study in corrective justice - an effort to
articulate a coherent, internally consistent set of rules and principles to decide whether a
particular plaintiff has a right to recover compensation from a particular defendant. Issues of
public policy and regulation are, at best, subsumed in the rules. See C. Gregory, H. Kalven and
R. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts xxii, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) and
Weinrib, "Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law" (1983), 2 J of Law &Phil 37.
73. See Spitzer, "An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort" (1977), 50 S. Cal
L Rev. 515 at 520.
74. G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents; a Legal andEconomic Analysis. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970).
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otherwise associated with organizing the collective group and, also, to
prevent free-rider problems.
The strongest arguments in favour of compensation on these grounds
can be made in the context of state-individual relations. Compensating
one individual by ordering another individual to pay him or her a sum of
money is simply injuring the latter to benefit the former. There is no a
priorireason to believe that the injured is better than the payer or that the
injured's utility associated with the money is greater than the payer's.
Even if there were, serious doubts must be harboured as to the ability to
achieve any consensus among people whose social rankings are not
consistent; that is, it is difficult to engage in interpersonal comparisons of
utility when only compensation is being assessed and when questions of
the past and future behaviour of the injured and of the payor as well,
which might justify the loss-shifting, are excluded from inquiry. Stateindividual relations, however, can be analyzed on quite different terms.
First, it is feasible to anthropormophize a community which consists of
large numbers of individuals and hypothesize that it will be less riskaverse than the potential victim of its activities. If that is so, welfare gains
are generated by shifting the risk of injury from the potential individual
victim to the community. Second, if the losses represented by the
compensation are internalized by the state, they will be borne by all
private individuals who stood to gain from the deployment of those
resources in their next best bureaucratic use. The disappointed potential
beneficiaries will be impossible to identify as they will very likely not
know that they are victims. Also the forgone opportunity of benefiting
from state action is likely to be perceived to be less significant than the
actual loss suffered by the victim. Third, in the case of state-individual
relations, the potential beneficiaries who are victimized by the lossshifting will often outnumber the victims. In such circumstances, the
secondary cost avoidance advantages of loss-spreading, will be present. If
the losses are externalized over time, the welfare gains associated with the
loss-spreading will increase. 75 Loss-spreading rationales, of course, have
enormous implications when the defendant is the community and the
loss-spreading mechanism is either taxation or increases in the money
supply. 76 Fourthly, compensation arguments also draw on the idea of
75. Of course, those gains will be offset by an increase in the magnitude of loss perceived by
the "insurers" who will pay out a portion of their existing wealth, rather than simply fail to
receive some unknowable portion of state largesse.
76. While loss-spreading may not be a rationale for the development of tort law, there is little
doubt that the reallocation of losses over large numbers and over time is a significant
consequence of the implementation of tort law. See A. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1988). The available evidence suggests that the federal government
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"fairness as equality". Many Continental writers in thinking about state
responsibility begin their analyses with Article 13 of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man as the origin of the French administrative concept of
"equality before public charges". That concept is reflected in the current
Quebec Civil Code and was offered as justification for compensation in
Lapierre.77 The interpretive rule has been justified on the ground that the
burden of public action ought to be borne by the community rather than
imposed on a particular victim. In a sense, the concept can be understood
as a reflection of ex post equal protection - that state action should not
arbitrarily discriminate among members of the public.
Finally, and perhaps most important, in thinking about distributional
equity and loss-spreading, two related ideas must be kept in mind. The
first idea is that the class of injuries to be redistributed must be identified.
Will redistribution include losses associated only with property
ownership, with personal liberty, with personal bodily integrity, with
economic wealth, with psychological well-being, and so on? The second
idea is that the groups of people to whom the losses will be shifted must
be determined - that is, distribution of losses across the community
must take into account the particular fiscal or taxation policies that the
state employs as its loss-spreading mechanism. 78 Identification of the
particular injuries and groups will require a wide-ranging debate of a
political rather than technical content and character.
The design and evaluation of public liability regimes can only be
undertaken after there has been a full airing of ideas about a variety of
issues - the legitimacy of public bureaucracies, wealth redistribution, the
role and meaning of community, equal treatment, utilitarianism, lossshifting, corrective justice and so on. Only after some agreement about

does not procure market insurance in respect of contingent tort liability, nor are associated
costs passed on to the community through increases in product prices, with concomitant
reductions in product usage. Whatever the incentive effects of legal risks might be in the private
sector, they are unlikely to operate in the same fashion in the case of public institutions.
77. It also underlies some decisions of English judges who have created interpretive rules
protecting a limited class of property owners from the redistributive judgments of the legislative
branch of government. See Attorney Generalv. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] A.C. 508
at 542. (H.L.(E.)) However, such judicial intervention is largely conservative in nature and
runs foul of the usual objections.
78. During the nineteenth century, the recognition of property and contract claims was
coupled with taxation policies which taxed the wealth of property owners and of the
commercial classes through excise and sales taxes. Thus, if judges had chosen to recognize nonproperty and non-economic interests they would have implicitly been shifting wealth to a
broad range of potential victims from a relatively narrow range of taxpayers. Stated implicity
in Risk, R.C.B., "Lawyers, Courts and The Rise of the Regulatory State" (1984), 8 Dalhousie
L.J 31. See also Pery, Harvey, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1955) a factual and descriptive study of taxation and fiscal policy in Canada.
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how those ideas are combined to comprise the Canadian body politic,
can there be a serious evaluation of the current liability regime and the
best scheme with which to replace it. Such a project demands not only
a sophisticated intellectual apparatus, but a solid grounding in practical
details. It is a daunting, ambitious, but vital undertaking.
V.

Conclusion

It should be understood that the criticisms made of Tener and Lapierre
are not simply criticisms of particular judges or judgments. The critique
is intended to cut much deeper and touch on the whole legal way of
thinking about the world and ourselves. Law does not simply serve
society, it defines and helps to constitute that society and its members:
law is one of the discursive practices, institutional structures and
intellectual media for organising and acting in the world. There is nothing
beyond, above or below interpretation, but more interpretation. The
belief in a possible rendezvous with an ultimate reality, unmediated by
discourse, is mistaken. It is a romantic conceit, a dangerous deceit and,
for many, a disabling crutch. It is too simplistic to presume that lawyers
stand outside the world and can understand, evaluate and control the
world without being part of it. By being in the world, they are front-line
combatants, whether they like it or not, in the political struggle to resist,
reproduce or change that world. Rightness is not about correspondence
with an external world nor a solipsistic harmony with our own
prejudices. It is to be found in the historical and reflective negotiation
between the two.
However, we are not condemned either to idolize the existing
discursive practices in their literalness or to engage in a demoralizing
solipsism. Lawyers must take responsibility for the world as it and for its
discursive and taxonomic supports. Insofar as these structures and
categories have been made, they can be re-made. But first, there must be
a greater understanding and appreciation of how they were made, why
they were made that way and how they function. While we can never be
outside the world's abstractions, we can "smash the semantic box in
which our current thinking is locked ...[and] craft a better cabinet out
of materials really available in a real world. '79 Such knowledge is a form
of empowerment in itself: it gives perspective and purchase on the
'fabricatedness' and 'non-naturalness' of present arrangements. Social
justice can be realized through and in the process of world-(re)making.
The accent of truth must be detached and emancipated from the

79. Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am. U L Rev 131 at 157.
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particular social, economic and cultural relations that comprise the status
quo. Accordingly, the theoretical enterprise must undergo a radical reorientation. Philosophy (of law) becomes not a task of refined
description, but a project of engaged construction; (legal) hermeneutics
will replace epistemology.80 The theorist will not seek to pin down
foundational truths, but will strive to open up the essential dialogue of
world-making.
One place to begin would be to become aware of our existing
structures and lives - to recognize the intellectual constructs and
language of contracts, torts, and property. We are all prisoners of our
white lines on the freeway. It is true that we cannot navigate our lives
without some lines to follow; they tell us what we have come from and
what we are going to. Nonetheless, we must not forget that, in some
profound sense, we have not only painted those white lines, but we have
built the freeways as well. In our small legal world, we can begin to
rethink our categories, our curriculum, and our pedagogical techniques.
We must become receptive to a dialogue which replaces the perceived
reality of contracts, torts, property, and the like. Instead of reinforcing the
illusion of one reality, courts must open up the law to different voices and
realities; it must become "a medium through which particular people can
engage in the continuous work of making justice."'" That recognition and
achievement can take place incrementally. Perhaps that is all we can
hope for or want.
A story has a beginning, a middle, and an end, Aristotle said, and nobody
has proved him wrong yet; and that which has no beginning
and no end
82
but is all middle is neither story nor history. What is it, then?

80. See Hutchinson, "The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically" (1989), 103 Harv.L Rev.
555.
81. Minow, "Foreword: Justice Engendered" (1987), 101 Hanm. L Rev. 10 at 95.
82. Ursula K. Le Guin,Always ComingHome. (New York: Harper & Row, 1985) at p.63.

